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. vVORKMEN's COMPENSATION AcTS-AMENDMENTS CHANGING PERIOD FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DuE TO AGGRAVATION OF IN-

JURY-The tYPical workmen's compensation act provides both for an
award to compensate the employee for his original injury and for subsequent awards to compensate him for aggravation of the injury occurring after the original award. The time during which the original award
may be opened to allow additional compensation for subsequent aggravation may n~t be expressly limited, or opening may be limited to a
stated time after the original injury or the last payment of the original
award. By amendment, the legislature may either lengthen or shorten
this period for opening. Whether such amendment applies to a claim
for compensation for aggravation when the original injury occurred before the effective date of the amendment is the problem with which the
present comment 1s concerned. If what the courts say is taken to be
controlling, the cases seem to be in irreconcilable conflict upon almost
every point. However, the decisions themselves fall into a surprisingly
uniform pattern.1

A. Amendments Shortening Period for Opening
1. What the Courts Say

Should an amendment shortening the period for opening an award
on the ground of aggravation of the injury be construed to be retroactive
when the amendment is silent on that point? One court has said that
the amendment should be so construed because "the legislature meant
what it said"2 -in other words, that the amendment should be construed
to be retroactive because the legislature had not expressly stated that it
was to be prospective only. Another court has used just the opposite
reasoning: "There is nothing in the amendment . . . to suggest that a
retroactive effect was intended, and for this reason, if not for the more
fundamental reason that the impairing legislation was beyond the power
of. the legislature, the amendment roust be construed as not affecting
the parties' rights." 3 It may be significant to observe that the prospective
construction is a device for avoiding constitutional difficulties. If the
-court considers a retroactive application of the amendment unconstituFor a different treat~ent of tlie decisions see 165 A.L.R. 506 (1946).
Allen v. Mottley Const. Co., 160 Va. 875 at 890, 170 S.E. 412 (1933).
A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Court of Com~on Pleas of Essex County, 107 N.J.L. 38 at
41, 150 A. 771 (1930).
l
2
3
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tional, then it can avoid the embarrassment of declaring the amendment
in part unconstitutional by saying that the legislature intended the
amendment to have only prospective application. Before leaving the
point of construction, it should be noted that use of the labels "retroactive" and "prospective" is not free from difficulty. For example, is an
amendment which cuts off a claim for aggravation occurring after the
effective date of the amendment retroactive because the injury occurred
before that date?
Assuming that the amendment is construed to bar a claim for aggravation enforceable under the terms of the original statute, the employee
may argue that the amendment impairs the obligation of contract or
deprives him of property without due process of law. The contract theory
has been well stated as follows: "[T] he right of an employee to compensation arises from the contractual relation existing between him and
his employer on the date of the injury, and the statute then in force
forms a part of the contract of employment and determines the substantive rights and obligations of the parties, and ... no subsequent amendment which has the effect of increasing or diminishing the amount of
compensation recoverable can operate retrospectively to affect in any
way the rights and obligations prior thereto fixed."4 On the other hand,
it can be said that the employee's right to compensation and the employer's liability arise out of status rather than out of any contract, actual or
implied in law.11
Most courts ignore the contract approach and fight out the issue of
constitutionality on the battlefield of substance versus procedure. One
court has said that the amendment "fixes the time within which the
party must act, if he would enforce a present right. It is a statute of limitations. Such statutes ... neither create nor destroy rights, but pertain
to remedy solely;"6 but another court stated that, at the time the employee was injured, "his right attached" and "he was entitled to make
application from time to time, and be compensated, if the commissioner
4 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Watkins, 177 Okla. 30 at 31, 57 P. (2d) 622 (1936)
(dictum). See also Kelley v. Prouty, 54 Idaho 225 at 232, 30 P. (2d) 769 (1934): "In the
mstant case compensation was being paid pursuant to a contract entered into between the
parties, which was approved by the board, and the law in force as of the time when the
contract was entered into and approved became a part of the contract as if expressly written
into the same."
Ii ''Workmen's Compensation legislation rests on the idea of status, not upon that of
implied contract••••" Cudahy Packing Co. v. Paramore, 263 U.S. 418 at 423, 44 S.Ct. 153
(1923). Cf. "The liability of the employer under the act is not tortious, and is not contractual in the sense that it should be considered a part of the contract; but it is purely statutocy."
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106 at 114, 170 N.W. 275 (1919).
G In re Hogan, 75 Ind. App. 53 at 57, 129 N.E. 633 (1921).
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felt that he was entitled to additional compensation."; Not all courts
that treat the compensation for aggravation as a matter of substance hold
that the right to such compensation cannot be taken away without violating due process, for some such courts say that "the benefits conferred
upon [ the employee] by the Legislature are purely statutory and may at
any time be taken from him by the Legislature,"8 or that the legislature
can take away the remedy and leave the right. 9
Judging from such statements, one might conclude that the courts
are in hopeless disagreement. However, there is a surprising degree of
uniformity in the holdings, which may emphasize the danger of considering the courts' statements apart from their decisions on the facts.
2. What the Cases Hold

An amendment shortening the time during which the original award
may be opened to allow compensation for aggravation has generally been
held to bar opening at least when the period prescribed in the amendment has run, not only from the date stated in the amendment (the date
of the injury or the date of the last payment of compensation), but also
from the effective date of the amendment.10 Several courts, however,
reach a contrary result by construing the amendment not to apply when
the injury occurs prior to the amencfment.11 Assuming, however, that
7 Carbon Fuel Co. v. State Compensation Comm., 111 W. Va. 639 at 641, 163 S.E. 62
(1932).
8 Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Morris, 176 Okla: 68 at 69, 54 P. (2d) 353 (1935).
9 "[The amendment] is merely a statute limiting the power of the commission to any
act involving the reopening of the award within the period prescribed." Tischer v. City of
Council Bluffs, 231 Iowa 1134 at 1149, 3 N.W. (2d) 166 (1942).
10 Mattson v. Dep't. of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 55 S.Ct. 14 (1934) ("a purely statutory
right"); In re Hogan, 75 Ind. App. 53, 129 N.E. 633 (1921) ("a statute of limitations");
Vincent v. Allerton House Co., 256 N.Y. 522, 177 N.E. 25 (1931) ("remedy"); Marchuk
v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 106 Pa. Super. Ct. 249, 161 A. 771 (1932) ("procedure"); Savidge v. Dime Trust & S.D. Co., 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 333, 164 A. 734 (1933) (the
court pointed out the employee had had eight months after the effective date of the amendment to make any claim); Rednock v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 132 Pa. Super. Ct. 89, 200 A.
114 (1938) (court intimated there was no aggravation); Tischer v. City of Council Bluffs,
231 Iowa 1134, 3 N.W. (2d) 166 (1942) (amendment removed board's jurisdiction);
Ketzel v. Hammermill Paper Co., 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 462, 48 A. (2d) 89 (1946) ("procedure"). Cf. Chicago Board of Underwriters v. Industrial Comm., 332 Ill. 611, 164 N.E. 216
(1928).
11 See Cherry v. State Compensation Comr., 115 W. Va. 180, 174 S.E. 889 (1934); James
v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd., 117 W. Va. 493, 185 S.E. 909 (1936); A. P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Essex County, 107 N.J.L. 38, 150 A. 771 (1930)
(constitutional difficulties hinted if amendment were otherwise construed); Boshers v. Payne,
58 Idaho 109, 70 P. (2d) 391 (1937) (here employer sought to reopen). Query whether
amendment would, as these cases intimate, be retroactive if applied to bar recovery for
aggravation occurring after effective date of the amendment.
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the amendment has some application, some courts have held that the
award can be opened, though the period specified in the amendment has
expired, within an equivalent period running, not from the date specified in the amendment, but from the effective date of the amendment.12
One court, at least, is more strict and has held that, when the opening
was barred under the amendment literally applied, and the petition to
open was not made until eight months (more than a "reasonable time"?)
after the effective date of the amendment, the amendment barred opening, even though this would not have been the result if the period specified in the amendment had been held to run from the effective date of
the amendment.13 But other courts which do not hold that the period in
the amendment runs from the date it becomes effective have seen the
way clear to permit the award to be opened months after the effectiv:e
date of the amendment, even though the amendment, if literally applied,
would bar opening.14
Apparently the courts of only one state have permitted the amendment to destroy a claim for compensation for aggravation in existence
at the time the amendment became effective.15
12 heland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 166 A. 593 (1933); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Watkins, 177 Okla. 30, 57 P. (2d) 622 (1936); Graner Constr. Co. v. Brandt, 180 Okla.
221, 68 P. (2d) 788 (1937); Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Smith, 181 Okla. 313, 73 P.
(2d) 446 (1937); Ford Motor Co. v. McDonald, 185 Okla. 130, 90 P. (2d) 404 (1939);
Secrest v. Galloway, (Iowa, 1948) 30 N.W. (2d) 793.
13 Allen v. Mottley Const. Co., 160 Va. 875, 170 S.E. 412 (1933) (construction). Cf.
Consentina v. State Compensation Comr., 127 W. Va. 67, 31 S.E. (2d) 499 (1944) (amendment providing that "no further award may be made • • • on account of injuries occurring
prior to [a stated date] unless written application for such award ..• be filed with the
commissioners" within six months after the effective date of the amendment, held, constitutional). See also Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Morris, 176 Okla. 68, 54 P. (2d) 353 (1935), but
cf. Magnolia case, supra, note 14.
14 Strouse v. Quaker Knitting Mills, 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 39, 46 A. (2d) 526 (1946) (the
court permitted reopening four and a half months after the amendment took effect, "since
claimant's substantive right of action was in existence at the time the [amendment] became
effective, a reasonable time must be allowed to enforce this right.•••" See also Kelley v.
Prouty, 54 Idaho 225, 30 P. (2d) 769 (1934) (nine months or less-result reached by
construction); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Posey, 58 Ga. App. 723, 199 S.E. 543 (1938)
(five months-construction); Daytona Beach Boat Works v. Spencer, 153 Fla. 540, 15 S.
(2d) 256 (1943) (eleven months-dictum). Cf. Jenkins v. Heaberlin, 107 W. Va. 287,
148 S.E. 117 (1929); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25
S.E. (2d) 60 (1943).
15 State ex rel. Boswell v. Industrial Comm., 125 Ohio St. 341, 181 N.E. 476 (1932)
("a contingent right subject to change or modification by statute"); State ex rel. Thompson
v. Industrial Comm., 138 Ohio St. 439, 35 N.E. (2d) 727 (1941) ("express provision"
made the amendment apply).
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3. Conclusion

At the outset it should be recognized that the courts seem to treat
the claim for aggravation as distinct .from the claim for the orginal injury,16 and that an amendment shortening the time during which a
claim for aggravation can be made is not a mere statute of limitations.
Such an amendment may limit the time for presenting an existing claim
for aggravation, and it may also prevent the accruing of a claim for aggravation occurring after the effective date of the amendment. However,
·a strong argument can be made that the amendment cannot constitutionally destroy a claim for aggravation occurring before the amendment.
At most, it can limit the time for bringing action on such a matured claim
to a reasonable time after the effective date of the amendment.17 In a
laudable attempt to create certainty, a few courts have held that the
amendment, "in so far as it affects rights of action in existence when [it]
is passed," begins to run, "in the absence of a contrary provision. . .
when the cause of action was first subjected to its operation."18 Perhaps
the courts are merely borrowing from the legislatures the measure of a
reasonable time.
Thus, it would appear that an accrued claim for aggravation arising
under an existing statute is a right of sufficient dignity tp be considered
property within the protection of state and federal due process clauses,
but that the right, if it may be called a right, to compensation for future
aggravation of an existing injury is not property and m~y be destroyed
by the legislature. Though the legislature may not be able to destroy certain existing rights by repealing the statute which created them, yet a
lG In Mattson v. Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151 at 154, 55 S.Ct. 14 (1934), the
Supreme Court summarized the employee's argument as follows: "The appellant insists that
at the date of his injury the statute conferred upon him not only a right to make his original
claim and receive compensation, but a further right to file an additional claim, without limit
as to time, and to receive readjusted compensation for aggravation of his condition due to
his injury. This he says, is a vested right, is property, and its enforcement may not be abolished or limited, consistently with the due process clause- of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution." The court rejected this argument and held that the amendment
could destroy the employee's "purely statutory right" for compensation for aggravation occurring after the effective date of the amendment. Query whether the amendment could have
destroyed a claim for an original injury or for aggravation occurring before the amendment.
17 Cf. Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 280 (1830); Jenkins v.
Heaberlin, 107 W. Va. 287, 148 S.E. 117 (1929). Logically the amendment could be
treated both as limiting the time for making a claim for aggravation occurring prior to the
amendment to a reasonable time after the effective date of the amendment, and as preventing
any claims for aggravation arising after the effective date of the amendment. However, a
court which does not distinguish between the two aspects of the amendment might hold that
the claim for aggravation could accrue within a reasonable time after the effective date. Such
a view would avoid the uncertain fact question as to when the aggravation occurred.
18 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Watkins, 177-Okla. 30 at 33, 57 P. (2d) 622 (1936).
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property right cannot arise under a non-existent statute.10 Perhaps this
is a situation where the nebulous phrase, "vested right,''20 borrowed from
feudal real property law, has some usefulness today. The claim for aggravation becomes vested when the aggravation occurs, and a subsequent
statute cannot destroy it; but, before the aggravation occurs, the claim is
merely contingent upon the occurrence of the aggravation while the
statute is in effect. If the test of property in the constitutional sense is the
substantiality of the right or interest concerned, then the accrued, but
not the inchoate, claim for aggravation is substantial, judging from the
deference the courts have shown it.
The above summary is drawn more from the decisions of the pertinent cases than from what the courts have said. It is believed that it
will explain the results reached in most of the cases. The issue of retroactive versus prospective construction has been passed over for two reasons: if the amendment were to apply to accrued claims for aggravation,
it is believed to be unconstitutional, so that speculation over retroactive
construction of the amendment is idle; and, when the amendment is
applied to aggravation arising after its enactment, there is no question
of retroactivity if the claim for aggravation is treated a~ separate from the
claim for the original injury.
The contract theory is ignored both because it is largely ignored by
the courts and because it is a fiction. A fiction might be justifiable if it
were necessary to reach a just result; but it is believed that the property
theory reaches such a result without resort to the realm of legal fantasy.
Finally, a caveat is in order. Some statutory choses in action may be
destroyed by the legislature.21 What the touchstone is that reveals which
statutory choses may be destroyed and which may not is not the problem
of this comment.22 It is submitted, however, that the accrued claim for
19 "[A] right cannot be considered a vested right, unless it is something more than such
a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general
laws .•••" 2 CooLEY, CoNsnTUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 749 (1927).
20 Cf. Reynolds v. E. Clemens Horst Co., 35 Cal. App. 711, 170 P. 1082 (1918).
21 See, for example, the decisions sustaining retroactive application of the portal-to-portal
act. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 169 F. (2d) 254, cert. denied,
(U.S. 1948) 69 S.Ct. 236; Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 169 F. (2d)
262, cert. denied, (U.S. 1948) 69 S.Ct. 166. Cf. Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 33
S.Ct. 428 (1913) (legislature had no power to destroy statutory chose in action); Cusick v.
Feldpausch, 259 Mich. 349 at 353, 243 N.W. 226 (1932) ("A common-law right of action
is property and entitled to protection•••• fA] statutory right of action for damage to person or
property, which has accrued, is a vested right, and likewise to be protected").
22 See Brown, ''Vested Rights and the Portal-to-Portal Act," 46 MicH. L. REv. 723
(1948); Cotter, "The Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation-The Portal-to-Portal Act
of 1947," 34 VA. L. REv. 26 (1948).
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aggravation is a claim of the sort that the legislature cannot destroy, judging from the decisions of the courts of all states but one that have passed
upon the matter. It should be noted that the courts of the one dissenting
state seem never to have squarely considered tlie problem.23 It is extremely difficult to find any overwhelming public interest in favor of
.allowing the legislature to destroy an employee's claim for aggravation
which has arisen under the plain terms of an existing statute.

B. Amendments Lengthening Period for Opening
Some amendments to workmen's compensation acts have increased,
rather than shortened, the period during which an award can be opened
for aggravation. When the injury occurs but the award has not become
final prior to the amendment, there should be no p~rticular difficulty in
holding the employer liable for aggravation occurring during the extended period and after the effective date of the amendment.24 But
when the employer has made full compensation for an injury under the
existing statute, can a subsequent amendment impose additional liability
upon him? A prospective construction of the amendment avoids such a
problem.25 But if the amendment is construed to apply retroactively,
the issue of cons_titutionality is squarely presented. Arguably there is an
impairment of obligation of contract;20 but again it is submitted that the
contract argument is artificial. A more forceful argument is that the
amendment, so applied, deprives the employer of property without due
process.27 By retroactive legislation the employer who had completely
discharged his liability for an injury and aggravation thereof under existing statutes is inade to pay additional compensation for the same injury.
23 See note 17, supra.
24 J. W. Ferguson Co.

v. Seamen, 119 N.J.L. 575, 197 A. 245 (1938); Bordick v. John
Conlon Coal Co., 144 Pa. Super. Ct. 522, 19 A. (2d) 536 (1941); Brusco v. Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Co., 148 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 24 A. (2d) 710 (1942); Gange Lumber Co. v.
Rowley, 326 U.S. 295, 66 S.Ct. 125 (1945). See also, re Illinois amendment increasing the
period during which the employer may r=pen the award: Superior Coal Co. v. Industrial
Qomm., 321 Ill. 240, 151 N.E. 890 (1926); Smolen v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 32, 154
N.E. 441 (1926); Snowden McSweeney Co. v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 423, 155 N.E.
277 (1927); Perry Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 343 Ill. 525, 175 N.E. 801 (1931).
25 Mus~nen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 50 Wyo. 462, 62 P. (2d) 287 (1936). Cf.
Dashiell v. Holland Maide Candy Shops, 171 Md. 72, 188 A. 29 (1936).
26 Cf. Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518 (1930);
.Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Carlton, 151 Fla. 238, 9 S. (2d) 359 (1942).
27 United hon Works v. Smethers, 159 Okla. 105, 14 P. (2d) 380 (1932). Cf. Arnold
& Murdock Co. v. Industrial Comm., 314 ID. 251, 145 N.E. 342 (1924); Preveslin ·v. Derby
& Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518 (1930).
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If, however, the aggravation occurs after the amendment, and the
claim for aggravation is considered as separate from the claim for the
original injury, the amendment might escape the stigma of being retroactive.28 But it is still possible to argue that an amendment which imposes liability upon a former employer even for future aggravation of
the injury of a former employee is unreasonable and arbitrary in cases
where the injury occurred, and the liability therefor under existing law
was fully discharged, prior to the effective date of the amendment. The
success of such an argument is another matter, for some courts, at least,
strongly favor such amendments. At least, it would seem that only a
court which strongly favored such an amendment would be willing to
resort to the argument that " [ t] here is no constitutional inhibition
against the revival of a barred remedy."29 Though the idea of a right
without a remedy is in itself somewhat transcendental, the idea of a
"barred remedy" for a non-existent right is astounding. The amendment
does not merely revive a barred remedy but attempts to give a new right
and a remedy for it. If a sympathetic court desires to give effect to the
amendment, it might avoid doing violence to legal theory by a finding
that under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, the employer is _in no position to raise the due process issue. 80

W. Stirling Maxwell, S. Ed.
28 Cf. Independent Pier Co. v. Norton, (D.C. Pa. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 974; Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Cardillo, (C.C.A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 299; Luckenbach S.S. Co.
v. Norton, (C.C.A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 137; Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, (Ct.
App. D.C., 1939) 108 F. (2d) 492.
29 Lane v. Department of Labor & Industries, 21 Wash. (2d) 420 at 426, 151 P. (2d)
440 (1944). "We are not here dealing with the revival of a right or claim which has been
extinguished, but simply with a power of the board to afford a specific remedy within three
years of the date of accident because one year was found by the Legislature to be inadequate
for the just determination of a disability classification." Montgomery v. Seneca Iron & Steel
Co., 236 App. Div. 19 at 21, 257 N.Y.S. 556 (1932). For other questionable reasoning see
]. W. Ferguson Co. v. Seaman, 119 N.J.L. 575, 197 A. 245 (1938).
so Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295, 66 S.Ct. 125 (1945) (increased award
paid from state insurance fund; increase in employer's premium speculative and trifling).

